

# Analýza kořenových příčin a benefit mnoha zdrojů dat



**FLOWCUTTER**

Mgr. Matej Pavelka PhD.

## Čím začít?

■ Čas techniků je drahý

■ Troubleshooting je na problémy,

kt je levnější řešit hned a nečekat na důsledky

# Use cases

- #1 Outgoing DDoS
- #2 Hacked camera damaged /22 prefix
- #3 Hotline on steroid
- #4 Syslog
- Co si odnést

# #1 case



Latency issue at Enterprise customer

# Anomaly

 Latency and connection issues in MS Teams

 For ~10 minutes

 Every ~1.5h

# Typical stack

Zabbix

Mikrotik winbox



Smoke ping




Configuration window for Torch (Running) showing interface eth0-1-PublicIP and entry timeout 00:00:03.

Session Settings Dashboard  
Quick Set  
CAPsMAN  
Interfaces  
Wireless  
WireGuard  
Bridge  
PPP  
Mesh  
IP

Torch (Running)  
Basic  
Interface: eth0-1-PublicIP  
Entry Timeout: 00:00:03 s




# CPU on router



# Traffic on port

One eth port w/ peaks in bps





# SNMP x Flows


**SNMP - 1D dimensional time series - what's happening with the router**

**Flows - high-cardinality big data - who is communicating with whom**

# Flow data



All traffic **BPS**, **PPS**, **FPS**, talkers




10 minutes

# Before / after

## During anomaly

## Before anomaly



# Drill down

Source port = 53



# Reflection attack

Distributed attack using open DNS ports

Mitigated using BGP FlowSpec: **Src/Dest ports = 53/24335**




# Open ports

**Automated scan** (every night)

**DNS port open** on SME customer's public IP

Example screenshot (not the actual case)



## Outcome

- ISP was able to detect anomaly and find root-cause

- ISP mitigated it before customer called.

- Open ports scan and alerting set up to spot anomaly earlier next time

## Risks

- ISP could lose its customer **if not resolved next day**

- Other customers could be influenced



## Use cases

#1 Outgoing DDoS

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#4 Syslog

Co si odnést






# #2 case

**Talkers anomaly vs IP reputation**


# Anomaly on talkers

11.6 Gb/s




Flows per second (peak)

6.07 K



Talkers (peak)


254 K




Calculated on 10s interval

# Before / after

## During anomaly




## Before anomaly



# Anomaly on port 23

## Protocols and ports

### Top Protocols




Protocol	Value	Percent
TCP	29 Mil	80%
UDP	6 Mil	17%
ICMP	1 Mil	3%
GRE	36 K	0%
IPv6-ICMP	32 K	0%
ESP	11 K	0%
IPv6	1 K	0%

### IP Version




IP Version	Value	Percent
IP version 4	36 Mil	100%
IP version 6	32 K	0%

### Top Source Ports



Port	Value	Percent
12074	8 Mil	38%
48617	4 Mil	21%
443	4 Mil	19%
0	1 Mil	6%
53	1 Mil	5%
23	476 K	2%
80	441 K	2%
5900	320 K	1%
59187	263 K	1%
10050	214 K	1%
5228	125 K	1%
8883	111 K	1%
13389	105 K	0%
6881	96 K	0%
123	87 K	0%
48244	84 K	0%
48260	84 K	0%
47507	74 K	0%
52712	73 K	0%
51416	71 K	0%

### Top Destination Ports



Port	Value	Percent
23	13 Mil	59%
443	4 Mil	20%
53	1 Mil	6%
80	477 K	2%
5900	335 K	2%
771	302 K	1%
0	245 K	1%
2048	218 K	1%
10050	201 K	1%
12074	198 K	1%
2816	161 K	1%
769	158 K	1%
8883	137 K	1%
6881	130 K	1%
5228	120 K	1%
51416	116 K	1%
48617	111 K	1%
13389	107 K	0%
123	107 K	0%
22	99 K	0%

# Single host traffic

## Traffic

Transferred bytes (total)

52.2 GB

Download

6.94 GB

Upload

45.2 GB


Talkers (peak)

505899

Flows (peak)

1727 f/s

Traffic & Talkers



Name	Mean	Max	Min
Traffic (bits/s)	14.6 Mb/s	75.2 Mb/s	0 b/s
Talkers (right y-axis)	202 K	506 K	0
Previous day Traffic (bits/s)	1.04 Mp/s	16.8 Mp/s	0 p/s

## Country & ASN & IP addresses

### Telemetry

Traffic origin



Top Source ASN




Top Destination IPs



# Impact

- Home camera on botnet
- IP on blacklist
- /22 IP Prefix on blacklist
- 30+ emails from ASNs
- Clean up



The screenshot shows the AbuseIPDB website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the AbuseIPDB logo and links for Home, Report IP, Bulk Reporter, Pricing, About, FAQ, and Documentation. Below the navigation bar, there is a search bar with the text "AbuseIPDB »" and a search input field. A green banner below the search bar contains the text "Check an IP Address, Domain Name, or Subnet e.g. 86.49.233.137, microsoft.com, or 5.188.10.0/24". The main content area shows a search result for an IP address (redacted) with the text "was found in our database!". Below this, it states "This IP was reported 10 times. Confidence of Abuse is 63%:" followed by a progress bar showing 63%. The result also includes fields for ISP, Usage Type, Hostname(s), Domain Name, Country (Czechia), and City (Stredocesky kraj). At the bottom, there is a note: "IP info including ISP, Usage Type, and Location provided by IP2Location. Updated monthly."

## Use cases

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Co si odnést


# Case #3

Hotline operator on steroids



# ASN enrichment

Top Source ASN ⓘ



TikTok	Value: 5 Bil
Datacamp Limited	Value: 1 Bil
ISP Alliance a.s.	Value: 880 Mil
O2 Czech Republic, a.s.	Value: 605 Mil
GOOGLE	Value: 499 Mil
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK	Value: 468 Mil
SH.cz s.r.o.	Value: 349 Mil
Akamai International B.V.	Value: 309 Mil
Seznam.cz, a.s.	Value: 298 Mil
AMAZON-02	Value: 235 Mil

# Src/Dst Country

Transferred bytes (total)

84.5 MB

Traffic (peak)

14.3 kb/s

Packets (peak)

38.1 p/s

Talkers (peak)

8249

Flows (peak)

29.4 f/s

Traffic & Packets



Talkers & Flows



Country & ASN & IP addresses


Source Country




Top Source Country

China	687 K
United States	172 K
India	113 K
South Korea	58 K
Brazil	41 K
Taiwan	38 K
Russia	31 K
Japan	29 K
Ukraine	29 K


Top Source AS



Top Destination AS



# Open ports



# Vulnerabilities

Number of findings

2.19k

High severity

3

Medium severity

36

Low severity

40

Log severity

25

Most of the findings:

10.30.3.14

Most visited CVE

CVE-1999-0632


TOP 10 IP



TOP 10 CVEs

CVEs	Description
CVE-1999-0632	RPC Portmapper Service Detection (TCP)
CVE-2020-25073	Apache HTTP Server /server-status accessible (HTTP)
CVE-2011-3389,CVE-2011-3389,CVE-2011-3389	SSL/TLS: Deprecated TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Protocol Detec
CVE-2017-0143,CVE-2017-0143,CVE-2017-0143	Microsoft Windows SMB Server Multiple Vulnerabilities-Re
CVE-2010-0020,CVE-2010-0020,CVE-2010-0020	Microsoft Windows SMB Server NTLM Multiple Vulnerabili

TOP 10 open ports



Panel Title

IP	Hostname	Protocol	Port	Severity	CVEs	CVSS ↓	Description	Timestamp
10.10.1.14		tcp	445	High	CVE-2010-0020,CVE-2010-0...	10	Microsoft Windows ...	2024-09-07 20:29:25.297020
10.10.1.14		tcp	445	High	CVE-2017-0143,CVE-2017-0...	8.10	Microsoft Windows ...	2024-09-09 03:46:45.069686
10.10.1.14		tcp	445	High	CVE-2017-0143,CVE-2017-0...	8.10	Microsoft Windows ...	2024-09-10 10:01:08.418766
10.30.3.14		tcp	80	Medium	CVE-2020-25073	5.30	Apache HTTP Serve...	2024-09-08 03:31:36.150154
10.30.3.14		tcp	443	Medium	CVE-2020-25073	5.30	Apache HTTP Serve...	2024-09-07 10:46:50.018863

## Benefits

- ISP was able to quickly respond to customer complaints on hotline
- Technical support can easily rule out operator's fault
- In some case junior support person can answer

## Risks

- Spending valuable time of technical staff on trivial issues
- Not being able to prove SLA to enterprise clients

## Use cases

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Co si odnést



# Case #4

Syslog for troubleshooting



# Logs

## Logins & configuration push



LOGY (bez: watchdog,api,dropbear)

timestamp ↓	host	message
2024-11-05 09:25:45	10.40.231.161	<30>Nov 5 09:25:45 hostapd: ath0: STA 00:27:22:be:82:48 WPA: pairwise key handshake completed (RSN)
2024-11-05 09:25:45	10.40.231.161	<30>Nov 5 09:25:45 hostapd: ath0: STA 00:27:22:be:82:48 IEEE 802.1X: authenticated - EAP type: 25 (PEAP)
2024-11-05 09:21:17	10.40.231.161	<30>Nov 5 09:21:17 hostapd: ath0: STA 00:27:22:be:82:48 WPA: group key handshake completed (RSN)
2024-11-05 08:32:15	10.40.237.49	<30>Nov 5 08:32:15 wireless: ath0 Received deauth from c4:93:d9:d7:78:54. Reason: Deauthenticated because sending STA is leaving (or has left) the basic service a
2024-11-05 08:32:12	10.40.237.49	<30>Nov 5 08:32:12 wireless: ath0 Received reassoc_req from c4:93:d9:d7:78:54.
2024-11-05 08:32:12	10.40.237.49	<30>Nov 5 08:32:12 wireless: ath0 Sending deauth to c4:93:d9:d7:78:54. Reason: STA does not want to use the mechanism (37).



## Use cases

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Co si odnést



Shrnuti

## Závěr

- Čas techniků je drahý

- Troubleshooting je na problémy,

kt je levnější řešit hned a nečekat na důsledky

- ???


- ???

## Závěr


- Čas techniků je drahý
- Troubleshooting je na problémy,  
kt je levnější řešit hned a nečekat na důsledky
- Používejte více zdrojů dat, vč netflow
- ???

# Correlate multiple data sources

- Technici
- Nástroje
- Zdroje dat
- Orchestra



## Závěr

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- Troubleshooting je na problémy,  
kt je levnější řešit hned a nečekat na důsledky
- Používejte více zdrojů dat, vč **netflow**
- Používejte  kt jsou efektivní

# Ad hoc queries

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cycMnXpblpU>



# Děkuji

